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Risk has become a four-letter word in much of the environmental
community. Carol Browner, the Clinton Administration's Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator recently deleted risk from the list of
the EPA's Guiding Principles,' reportedly at the behest of environmental
group leaders.' This action, reversing the focus of prior administrations on
risk-based priority setting,' reflected the perception among environmentalists
that making risk analysis a centerpiece of EPA's work inhibits regulatory
activity and hampers environmental protection.
The retreat from risk as a central analytic focus of environmental
decision-making represents a poor policy choice. Reducing risk is, almost by
definition, the central purpose of environmental regulation. As John D.
Graham and Jonathan B. Wiener point out in their new book Risk vs. Risk:
Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment, "risk tradeoffs are a
pervasive feature" of both individual and governmental decision-making
regarding human health and the environment.4 Identifying, weighing, and
comparing the risks (and benefits) of competing policy options are essential
components of good environmental regulation. Fundamentally, there is no
escaping risk analysis. If it is not done explicitly, with careful consideration
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of the alternatives available, risk tradeoffs will occur implicitly. Decision-
making may be driven by public fear and special interest lobbying, and policies
may not reflect the best interest of citizens.
The anti-risk attitude that has recently come to dominate the thinking of
the environmental community has been engendered by a number of factors.
First, environmentalists see some risk analysis proposals as a backdoor effort
to promote deregulation. The Contract With America, for example, calls for
labyrinthine regulatory impact analyses designed not to promote careful
consideration of competing policy choices but to hamstring the EPA.5 The
proposed analyses cover 23 specific criteria and include intricate cost-benefit
calculations for every rule affecting more than 100 people or costing more than
$1 million, imposing a time-consuming and potentially endless series of
regulatory hurdles on EPA for even very minor regulations.6 The House
legislation implementing the Contract7 mandates even more obfuscatory and
burdensome risk assessment procedures, which the Wall Street Journal
observed (approvingly!) would ensnare bureaucrats in red tape.'
Second, environmentalists worry that risk analysis will ignore values that
cannot readily be monetized. Some supporters of risk assessment in the
regulatory process advocate a "hard" approach to risk analysis9 that goes
beyond informing decision-making and replaces the policy process with a rigid
algorithm for adding up costs and benefits.'0 Environmentalists fear that such
a process will systematically ignore or undervalue the benefits of environmental
regulation, which are almost always less certain and harder to quantify than
its costs. How much, for example, is a pretty view worth? With such concerns
in mind, Mark Sagoff and others argue that environmental policy-making is
irreducibly about values and therefore quintessentially "political" and not
5. Paul Portney, Chain-Saw Surgery: The Killer Clauses Inside the 'Contract,' WASH.
POST, Jan. 15, 1995, at A23.
6. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 135 (Ed Gillespie & Robert Schellhas eds., 1994).
7. See "The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995," H.R. 9, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995).
8. Real Risk Reform, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1995, at A20.
9. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 584-586 (1992) (spelling out difference
between "hard" approach to risk assessment that tries to put monetary values on all costs and
benefits of a particular regulatory intervention and to reduce policy process to a net benefit
calculation among competing policy options and a "soft" approach that views risk comparison as
an indicative but not definitive policy guide, recognizing that some important values are hard to
quantify).
10. The classic "hard" version of risk assessment is Office of Management and Budget,
Reforming Regulation and Managing Risk-Reduction Sensibly, in BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1992 (arguing that regulatory agencies should set priorities and





amenable to welfare-maximizing "economic" calculations."l
Third, environmentalists think that certain kinds of costs and benefits
(such as harms borne by disadvantaged communities or individuals with special
sensitivities to environmental threats) will be given short shrift because of
biases inherent to the "expert" decision processes that underlie risk analysis. 2
More generally, they fear that the equity or distributional effects of risk-based
policies will be overlooked. 3
Other critics worry that risk-based decision-making will ignore public
preferences or is otherwise susceptible to special interest manipulation.' 4
Donald Hornstein argues, for example, that "the logic of collective action
predicts that the technical process of making risk-based decisions is more
accessible to those special interests that can consistently afford to deploy
technically competent scientists, economists, attorneys, and public relations
firms to represent their interests . . ." A similar critique by Wendy
Wagner suggests that science is used by policy-makers to camouflage difficult
regulatory decisions.16
Although special interests do manipulate the regulatory process, Hornstein
and others misidentify the cause of this problem. An open analytical process
supported by the clear decision rules that good risk assessment methodologies
provide-even if open to special interest lobbying-is more transparent and
thus less susceptible to distortion than uninformed policy-making in the non-
analytic darkness.' 7 By the same token, Wagner's analysis, even if true, is
11. See Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradiction
in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. 283, 286-96 (1982) [hereinafter Sagoff, We Have Met the
Enemy]. See generally MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988).
12. See Donald T. Hornstein, Paradigms, Process, and Politics, in WORST THINGS FIRST?:
THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 147, 150 (Adam M.
Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994) [hereinafter WORST THINGS FIRST] (arguing that "risk
models used by experts are not value-neutral" and that they tend to emphasize "real" risks, thus
downplaying worst-case assumptions.). Nevertheless, Hornstein fails to separate flaws in the
current methodologies that could be corrected (e.g., by better benefit measurements or the use
of "expected value" analysis to accurately reflect small risks) from the underlying theory of trying
to make decisions by comparing risks.
13. See Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy, supra note 11, at 288; Hornstein, supra note
9, at 592-603.
14. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 12, at 151 (arguing that sophisticated analytic
processes give advantage to highly organized interest groups which can bring resources to bear
to affect the decision process). See generally Gillette P. Clayton & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts,
and Agencies, 138 PENN. L. REV. 1027 (1990).
15. Hornstein, supra note 12, at 151.
16. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).
17. Hornstein posits that the best environmental law is made during "republican moments"
when emotional reactions to environmental crises spur Congress to go beyond their customary
"legislative shirking," to disregard the usual loud voices of (presumably anti-environmental) special
interests, and to adopt the more environmental values of the public-at-large. Hornstein, supra note
12, 155-57. See also Hornstein, supra note 9, at 577. But even his own examples tell another
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an argument not for less science and risk assessment but for better science and
risk assessment. If fact, all of the concerns just cited go to the kind of risk
procedures used and how risk assessment fits into the broader regulatory
decision structure-not to the core value of using risk analysis to inform
policy-making.
Neither the attempt by certain Congressional leaders and their allies to
advance a radical anti-environmental agenda under the "risk" banner nor the
recognized limitations of current risk assessment methodologies provide any
excuse for environmentalists to adopt anti-risk rhetoric. Risk assessment
provides a mechanism for informing environmental decision-making and for
reducing the technical uncertainty in environmental policy-making.'" Of
course, risk analysis cannot eliminate politics entirely from the policy process.
There will always remain decisions that must be made politically because the
answers depend on value judgments, a realm where science and the weighing
of relative risks provide few answers. But absent risk analysis, environmental
policy-making lacks a rational basis for sorting out priorities and determining
optimal funding levels for investments in public health and ecological
protection.
The value of rationality as a political ally must not be gainsaid. To
recapture lost political support, environmentalists need to demonstrate to the
public and Congress the values of the programs they support as well as their
recognition that the current budget contraints require that funds be targeted on
bigger rather than smaller risks. Effective risk-benefit and cost-benefit analysis
would demonstrate the value of many environmental programs-and provide
a powerful political weapon to wield against eco-skeptics in Congress and
elsewhere. 9 Having demonized risk analysis, the environmental community
may find it difficult to shift gears, but environmental advocates should
nevertheless stake a claim to risk as their own policy approach. Rather than
opposing risk-based legislation, they should fight to shape what sort of risk
assessment tools are put into law. To do otherwise is to surrender the analytic
high ground.
Given the significant degree of confusion over risk as an environmental
policy tool, Graham and Wiener's new book adds an important dimension to
story. Love Canal, for instance, spawned the Superfund Program, which is widely regarded as
one of the most poorly structured and wasteful environmental programs ever conceived. See
generally Richard Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE
AND LAW (1995); Jan Paul Acton, UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND: A PROGRESS REPORT (1989).
18. See Adam Finkel, Should We-and Can We-Reduce the Worst Risks First, in WORST
THINGS FIRST 3, 6-8 (clarifying the difference between "risk assessment"-a method for estimating
the probability and severity of hazards to human health, safety, and the natural environment-and
'risk management"-the process of weighing policy alternatives and setting priorities).
19. And where good analysis does not support a program, environmentalists should be




the debate. Starting with the observation that risk tradeoffs are ubiquitous,
Graham and Wiener introduce a method of risk tradeoff analysis (RTA)
designed to illuminate environmental and health choices. They observe that
regulatory actions aimed at a "target risk" may entail secondary effects or
"countervailing risks" that can reduce, or even negate, the risk reduction of
the policy actions aimed at the target risk, thus rendering the intervention less
effective or even counter-productive.
To flesh out this approach to risk analysis, Graham and Wiener provide
a useful typology of risk tradeoffs.2" Where a countervailing risk arises that
reduces the impact of the regulatory action vis-a-vis the original risk target,
Graham and Wiener call the result a "risk offset." Where the effort to reduce
one risk creates another one, we face "risk substitution." Where a
countervailing risk of the same type as the target risk arises but is imposed on
a different population, we have a "risk transfer." And where the countervailing
risk is both of a different type and affects a different population, Graham and
Wiener describe the outcome as "risk transformation." In every case, decision
errors ensue if the decision-maker fails to consider the countervailing risk.
Much of the volume is devoted to case studies highlighting the risk-
versus-risk phenomenon and demonstrating how a comprehensive risk tradeoff
analysis can yield "risk superior" results which allow for more overall risk
reduction than if the analysis focuses only on the original target harm. Graham
demonstrates, for example, in a chapter on "Saving Gasoline and Lives" that
the secondary effects of the fuel efficiency rules diminish the effectiveness of
the government's Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE).2 Cars with
better gas mileage are cheaper to operate, inducing people to drive more.
Moreover, because the requirements affect only new cars (and act, in effect,
as a tax raising their cost relative to older cars), people have an incentive to
hold on to their old, less-fuel-efficient cars longer than they might otherwise
have. Most dramatically, Graham demonstrates that the downsizing of vehicles
induced by the CAFE standards, far from saving lives by reducing air pollution
from cars, actually exposes the driving public to higher risks of injury and
death in crashes.
In another demonstration of RTA in operation, Paul D. Anderson and
Jonathan Wiener show that although eating fish exposes a person to the
countervailing risks of cancer from toxics in the fish, in most circumstances,
the new risk should not be of concern.22 In comparison to the potential
reduction in heart-disease from moving to a lower fat diet through increased
fish consumption, the cancer risk is minute. In another chapter, Susan Putnam
20. Graham & Wiener, supra note 4, at 19-25.
21. See John D. Graham, Saving Gasoline and Lives, in RISK vS. RISK 87, 89.
22. Paul D. Anderson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Eating Fish, in RISK vs. RSK 104, 107.
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and Jonathan Wiener walk the reader through the risk tradeoffs presented by
reducing the chlorination of public water supplies.23 They conclude that
although reduced chlorination can lower cancer risks, the countervailing risk
of increased water-borne disease would likely overwhelm any benefits. Other
chapters explore the risk tradeoffs entailed in estrogen therapy for menopause,
clozapine therapy for schizophrenia, allowing elderly drivers to keep their
licenses, recycling lead, regulating pesticides, and protecting the global
environment from climate change. Although each of these case studies
illuminates the use of RTA, the individual analyses are likely to be of real
value only to those with a substantive interest in the topic in question.
Of more general interest is Graham and Wiener's analysis of why
regulatory mistakes-misguided risk comparisons-are so prevalent. They
identify various telling explanations. First, and most powerfully, they note that
regulators often ignore countervailing risks.24 Where the secondary effects
are spread broadly across a diffuse group, it becomes relatively easy for the
regulator to disregard the consequences, particularly if the countervailing risk
falls outside the regulator's mandate. Where risks are transferred or substituted
onto groups outside the regulator's jurisdiction, the potential for an "omitted
voice" to exist and thus for the risk comparison to be misguided is
exacerbated. In such cases, risks shifted onto a "forgotten group" become an
"externality" and like any other uninternalized harm create a market failure
and inefficiency. Similarly, Graham and Wiener note that where countervailing
risks fall on disadvantaged groups, environmental justice concerns may be
raised.25 For example, if a well-organized community mounts a not-in-my-
backyard (NIMBY) campaign against an incinerator, the locally undesirable
land use (LULU) may end up in a politically less influential community.
Second, Graham and Wiener explain that heuristics or mental shortcuts
mean that some risks loom larger than others.26 Policy is often driven by
recent, big, visible problems despite the fact that slowly developing, less
visible harms may present objectively more serious risks. For example, the
Exxon Valdez oil spill ignited great passions, while burning coal generates
much less excitement despite its well-documented harm to air quality. The
absence of systematic risk assessment and priority setting exacerbates this
tendency to pursue the "risk of the month."
A third source of policy distortion, according to Graham and Wiener,
is "bounded oversight" by which the policy process narrows the vision of the
23. See Susan W. Putnam & Jonathan B. Wiener, Seeking Safe Drinking Water, in RISK
vs. RISK 124.
24. Jonathan B. Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS. RISK
226, 230-33.
25. Id. at 233.
26. Id. at 233-35.
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regulator and leads her (or even requires her) to disregard countervailing
risks.27 As Graham and Wiener make clear, while it is often the regulatory
agencies that are accused of "tunnel vision," the real fault lies with the
Congress that writes the laws and persists with a fragmented system of
legislative drafting and oversight that does little to reward comprehensive risk
analysis.28
While Graham and Wiener's review of the problems that create risk
tradeoff errors is quite thorough and convincing, the policy recommendations
they offer are less penetrating. Their central piece of advice-encouraging
policy-makers to adopt a comprehensive perspective and "treat the 'whole
patient' " 29-is too abstract to be really useful. It is, moreover, unlikely to
convert the very environmentalists most in need in persuasion. Although their
key observation is that "bounded specialization tends to blind the decision-
maker to information about risks outside his or her jurisdiction, to hamper
synoptic decision-making, and to encourage risk tradeoffs,"30 Graham and
Wiener shy away from the logical implications of their own analysis. Indeed,
while they acknowledge the problems created by the "disaggregation of
authority," 3' they hesitate in their support for more centralized expert
analysis, preferring instead "to devise and inculcate a broader method of
decision-making by actors at all levels. "
32
Furthermore, they reject "more centralization of power in the hands of
some unitary national or international agency-a 'physician king' entrusted,
like Plato's philosopher kings, with the power to resolve risk tradeoffs by
sagely choosing a single best strategy"33 and "pell-mell centralization," as
if these were the only alternatives. 3" Graham and Wiener proceed gingerly
to endorse a "modest form of centralization of oversight in the federal
government"35 and urge "serious consideration" of Justice Stephen Breyer's
call36 for risk analysis and environmental priority setting by a group of expert
risk managers based in the White House."
In fact, Breyer's approach, relying on a small, centralized administrative
group with inter-agency authority to rationalize decision-making,38 would
27. Id. at 235-240.
28. Id. at 238-39.
29. Id. at 242.
30. Id. at 238.
31. Id. at 240.
32. Id. at 242.
33. Id. at 246.
34. Id. at 247.
35. Id. at 247.
36. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993).
37. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 247.
38. BREYER, supra note 36, at 60.
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better capture the benefits of RTA than the mechanisms proposed by Graham
and Wiener. As Breyer argues, such a group offers the potential for careful
risk analysis and decision-making in a context that draws on real expertise,
permits insulation from political and special interest contortion, and stimulates
public confidence through its authoritativeness. 39 Breyer deftly turns aside
criticisms that his answer is undemocratic and elitist." Noting that "chaos
is not democracy," Breyer observes that his risk rationalization mechanism
need not deprive the People of their right to choose but rather will streamline
and clarify the policy choices the public faces.4 1
Although they fail to provide as comprehensive a solution as Breyer,
Graham and Wiener's endorsement of risk-benefit analysis of all proposed
legislation in advance of Congressional action makes good sense, as does their
recommendation that Congress acquire greater technical competence to support
its risk judgments.42 Their suggestion that Congressional risk judgments be
consolidated within a single Joint House-Senate Committee on Risk would help
to control the issue fragmentation endemic to Congress and the competition
for attention among oversight committees that discourages comprehensive risk
reduction. 3 But Graham and Wiener do not go far enough in attacking the
Congressional roots of the risk problems that plague environmental policy-
making." Mandatory turnover of both Committee members and staff, for
example, would inhibit empire building and the unthinking defense of narrowly
conceived policy interests.
More boldly, Graham and Wiener urge the rewriting of the existing
patchwork of environmental laws, many of which mandate non-risk-based
39. Id. at 62-63.
40. Id. at 73-74.
41. Id. As Breyer succinctly notes: "Representative democracy is not undemocratic." Id.
at 74.
42. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 250. Ironically, the Congress recently abolished
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) which Graham and Wiener argue might provide the
needed technical assistance. See John Heilemann, Proof That Gingrich & Co. Don't Know What
They're Doing; Newt Gingrich and Republicans in Congress, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan., 1995, at
14.
43. Wiener & Graham, supra note 24, at 251; see also Cass Sunstein, Valuing Life, NEW
REPUBLIC Feb. 15, 1993, at 36.
44. Specifically, EPA and other regulatory agencies are torn in competing directions by
dozens of House and Senate Committees and Subcommittees, each with their own narrow
legislative jurisdictions and resulting priorities. Any attempt to transfer resources from one area
of environmental activity to another higher priority (higher risk) problem brings a torrent of
criticism from those (both members and staff) whose oversight jurisdiction is limited to the
problem deemed to be of lesser importance. From their constricted viewpoint, the only issue that
matters is the one they control. As an EPA Assistant Administrator once remarked, "testifying
before a committee chairman whose pet issue has been put on the back burner can ruin your whole
day." Telephone Interview with Linda Fisher, Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides
and Toxic Substances, EPA (May 1991).
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regulatory action.45 Of course, reconstructing the nation's environmental rules
and adopting an integrated environmental statute would require thoughtful
drafting. Recent Congressional environmental debates offer little promise of
this sort of systematic and careful legislation, and Graham and Wiener's hope
that "cultural maturation" will bring a commitment to RTA seems accordingly
misplaced. Yet their call for a new paradigm for risk policy, based on
comprehensive and analytically rigorous consideration of risk tradeoffs, should
be heeded.
In a world full of politicians seeking "silver bullets," Graham and Wiener
offer a more sober truth: "Faced with complex, multidimensional realities .
• . [we must ignore] the temptation to despair or to be satisfied with piecemeal
responses" and instead have confidence in "the capacity of human reason to
confront and resolve risk tradeoffs."' After all, those who eschew risk
analysis offer even weaker foundations for environmental action. Hornstein,
for example, suggests that a "cause-oriented" paradigm might be a more useful
approach to setting environmental policy. Yet his desire for a regulatory model
that targets the "reasonably proximate causes of environmental problems,"
rather than the "effects" upon which a risk-orientation concentrates, provides
no traction for policy.47 Specifically, it offers no help in setting priorities,
addressing the problem of unintended consequences, or determining the
appropriate level of response to an identified cause of environmental harm.
Howard Latin proffers an even less helpful conclusion. Citing "pervasive
uncertainty,"48 he suggests that we abandon altogether any pretense of relying
on risk assessment or scientific "packaging" to make environmental policy and
simply accept that virtually all regulatory judgments entail policy judgments.49
However, as Jay Michaelson observes, "risk assessment science, though
complex, is not sorcery. " " Although its limitations are real, and science in
general is not value neutral in any strong sense, a risk-based approach to
environmental decision-making offers at least the hope of a rational
environmental policy process.
To suggest, as Hornstein does, that risk analysis may "rationalize choices
we should not make"51 is nonsense. Policy choices must be made and will
45. WIENER & GRAHAM, supra note 24, at 251.
46. Id. at 271.
47. See Hornstein, supra note 12, at 159.
48. Howard A. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency. Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1985).
49. Howard A. Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE
J. ON REG. 89, 90 (1988).
50. Jay Michaelson, Note, Rethinking Regulatory Reform: Toxics, Politics, and Ethics,
105 YALE L.J. 1891, 1903 (1996).
51. Hornstein, supra note 9, at 564. In fact, to dismiss the exercise saying that
"incommensurables" are being compared, id. at 602, is to beg an unbeggable question. Whether
to buy an ice cream cone or a newspaper presents incommensurable alternatives, but people still
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be made implicitly if not explicitly. What is the alternative to trying to
compare harms and maximize the reach of environmental spending? Should
we avoid data and rely on guesswork? Without denying the weaknesses of
current risk methodologies, the argument in favor of using risk analysis in
decision-making is simple: there is no other metric available that allows policy
choices to be made coherently. Moreover, we live in an era of rapid evolution
in the capacity of systems that depend on information management.52
Advances in computer technology are making synthesis and comparison of vast
quantities of data ever easier which, in turn, make the prospect of improved
risk analysis in the very near future a reasonable bet.53
Ultimately, to paraphrase Winston Churchill on democracy, risk-based
environmental decision-making may be the worst system ever invented except
for all the others. Building a more analytic approach to setting environmental
priorities and using risk tradeoff analysis to craft specific policy mechanisms
offer the promise of creating programs that will deliver environmental
value-maximum bang for the public's inevitably limited environmental buck.
Unless policy is crafted with this concept of value in mind, ensuring that the
benefits of regulation exceed the costs and that the maximum degree of safety
(risk reduction) is obtained for a given level of resources invested, public
support for environmental programs will erode.
Ultimately, environmentalists cannot afford to cede "risk" analysis to
their opponents. They must fight to make the concept their own. There is no
other basis for sound environmental policy-making.
find a way to choose. Similarly, government officials must find ways to weigh policy options.
Welfare comparisons (bounded by some notion of fundamental rights) offer something as a
decision mechanism in the place of nothing. Unhappiness with the relative weights given various
values in the calculus is a separate issue and should be addressed separately. See Carol Rose,
Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any
Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1631 (1989).
52. See WILLIAM GATES with NATHAN MYHRVOLD & PETER RINEARSON, THE ROAD
AHEAD (1995).
53. The EPA, for example, now makes judgments about pesticide safety on a non-
comparative basis judging the chemical that is on the docket against an abstract standard of safety.
With computer-enhanced data capacity the Agency soon should be able to analyze simultaneously
all pesticides across all crop uses and, cognizant of total dietary exposure to chemicals generally
and the risks created by not having pesticides available, set food safety standards for each pesticide
and its substitutes.
Vol. 13:603, 1996
